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Uncertain Recreation Quality and
Wildlife  Valuation: Are Conventional
Benefit  Measures Adequate?
Dennis  C. Cory, Bonnie  D. Colby,  and Edwin H. Carpenter
Theoretical  issues and empirical approaches  are discussed  for benefit estimation when
wildife resource users face  uncertain recreation quality. It is argued that selection of an
appropriate  benefit measure is predicated upon differing attitudes toward quality
uncertainty,  expected utility maximization,  and risk. In particular, it is shown that for
specific groups  in the user population,  conventional benefit measures do not apply,
and alternative welfare measures  are developed.  Implications  for restructuring
contingent valuation procedures are  discussed.
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In  estimating  benefits  attributable to wildlife
resources,  it is important to distinguish  indi-
viduals  based on their probability of site use.
For individuals with no chance of actually us-
ing a wildlife recreation  area but who are still
willing  to pay to insure  the continued  avail-
ability of the site, existence  values need to be
included in any benefit estimation procedure.
Existence benefits for nonusers were originally
discussed by Krutilla and have been attributed
to a variety of motivations including vicarious
consumption  (Daly and  Giertz),  bequest  val-
ues  (Krutilla  and  Fisher),  altruism  (Randall
and Stoll), and stewardship (Fisher and Rauch-
er).'  In  contrast  to nonuser benefits,  the vast
majority  of the  valuation  literature  has  ad-
dressed  theoretical  and  empirical  issues  in-
volved with user benefits,  benefits attributable
to individuals who are certain of participating
or who  have  some positive probability  of ac-
tive demand. For certain demanders of wildlife
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resources, conventional Hicksian surplus mea-
sures of benefits are appropriate. For uncertain
demanders, conventional  benefit measures do
not apply directly  and require  additional  re-
finement (Krutilla and Fisher).
Issues involved in benefit estimation under
conditions  of participation  uncertainty  have
been discussed by a variety of authors includ-
ing Bishop, Smith (1982), and Freeman (1979,
1984),  and  more  recently  by  Plummer  and
Hartman. This study departs from the demand
uncertainty  literature  by considering  wildlife
valuation issues which arise when certain de-
manders face uncertain recreation quality. The
objective of the paper is to elucidate the benefit
measures  applicable  under  alternative  sce-
narios involving uncertain recreation  quality.
Neither existence values for nonusers  nor op-
tion values attributable to demand uncertainty
apply  to  situations  involving  quality  uncer-
tainty. Literature  focusing on user benefits at-
tributable to  wildlife  resources  given quality
certainty is substantial. Representative studies
for consumptive  uses of wildlife, such  as rec-
reational fishing and hunting, include  Brown,
Singh,  and  Castle;  McConnell;  Wilson;  An-
derson;  and  Sandrey,  Buccola,  and  Brown.
While these investigations were couched in the
framework of certain recreation  quality under
a single-use management policy, a recent study
by Cory and Martin extended  empirical work
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in this area to the multiple-use  setting.  Simi-
larly,  previous  work  has  addressed  noncon-
sumptive uses of wildlife  under conditions  of
certain  recreation  quality  with representative
studies  including  Hay  and  McConnell,  Stoll
and Johnson,  and Cicchetti and Smith.  How-
ever,  once recreation  quality is viewed as un-
certain, previous  research  is much more lim-
ited.  Welfare-theoretic  issues  have  been
addressed in  a multiple-site  context  by both
Maler and Freeman  for the  case  of changing
recreation quality from one certain level to an
improved certain level.  Gallagher  and Smith
extended previous theoretical  work by exam-
ining  benefit  measures  appropriate  for  im-
proving  the  probability  of enjoying  a  high-
quality  recreation  experience.  Plummer  and
Hartman  discuss the bias introduced  by reli-
ance on consumer surplus as a benefit measure
when the quality of an environmental  amenity
is  uncertain.  Empirical  work  on  measuring
benefits  under  conditions  of uncertainty  has
not addressed recreation  quality but has been
limited to  demand  uncertainty  (Desvousges,
Smith,  and McGivney; Greenley,  Walsh,  and
Young).
In  the  following  sections,  theoretical  and
empirical  issues  are  discussed  for benefit  es-
timation  involving  certain  demanders  facing
uncertain  recreation  quality.  In the next  sec-
tion alternative  theoretical measures  of wild-
life  benefits  are presented,  followed by a dis-
cussion  of  the  conditions  under  which  a
particular benefit  measure applies.  Finally, in
the last section specific estimation procedures
are proposed and the implications  for contin-
gent valuation instruments  outlined.
Alternative  Benefit  Measures:
Theoretical  Considerations
Consider an individual who is uncertain about
the recreation  quality associated with the use
of wildlife  resources  (e.g.,  uncertainty  about
having  a successful hunt,  sighting a particular
rare  bird,  or  the  size  of a  fish  catch).  How
should the benefits generated by policies which
insure continued  availability  of the  resources
be  measured?  The  measurement  problem  is
one  of determining  the  maximum  expected
value of contingency  payments  for which the
uncertain  user  would  voluntarily  contract.
Payments  are contingent in the sense  that an
individual  may  be  willing  to  pay  different
amounts depending  on the quality of the rec-
reation experience. For simplicity, assume that
there are  only two  states of the world for the
user within a given period: a state in which the
quality  of the  recreation  experience  can  be
characterized  as  either  high  or  low.2 In  this
framework,  benefit  estimation  would  require
identification of contingent-payment pairs for
which the user facing quality uncertainty would
contract to guarantee continued availability of
a wildlife  recreation  area:  a payment of CH if
the high-quality  state should  occur or a pay-
ment of CL if  the low-quality state materializes.
Having  identified  these  contingent-payment
possibilities,  the pair  yielding the  largest  ex-
pected  value  is  the  appropriate  measure  of
maximum  willingness to pay.
Expected Consumer Surplus as a
Benefit Measure
Agreeing to a contingent-payment  scheme  is
assumed  to  guarantee  supply  of wildlife  re-
source  services.  If no  such  payment  plan  is
contracted,  the uncertain  user  foregoes  these
services and utility in the absence of the wild-
life resources becomes  U, where
(1) U= U(Y,  P, X,  O),
and  U is indirect utility  function without  ac-
cess to the wildlife  resources,  Y is income,  P
is vector of relative  prices, X is vector of ad-
ditional factors affecting  utility, and  O is un-
availability of wildlife resources.
This utility  outcome  is illustrated  in figure
1  a by point g, where utility is portrayed as state
dependent in such a way that the same income
level provides  a higher level  of utility in the
high-quality state than in the low-quality state. 3
A rational individual would be unwilling to
agree  to any contingent-payment  plan which
would make him worse  off (i.e.,  results in an
expected utility level less than U). One possible
payment  scheme  that would  not violate  this
condition involves Marshallian  expected sur-
plus (E[S]). Letting S,  and SL represent  con-
2  The theoretical results  presented here  could readily  be gener-
alized to a range of recreation quality states.
3 Smith (1982),  Freeman  (1984),  and Plummer  all discuss  the
implications of state-dependent  utility functions for  valuing nat-
ural amenities when demand  is uncertain.
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Figure 1.  Uncertain recreation quality and wildlife  resources:  alternative benefit measures
sumer  surplus  in  the  high-  and  low-quality
states,  respectively,
(2) E[S] =  .nH  SH + 7L SL,
where SH is defined by U(Y - SH, P, X,  1) =
U(Y, P, X,  O); SL is defined by UL(Y-  SL, P,
X,  1) = U(Y, P, X,  O); UH and UL are the utility
functions  in the  high- and  low-quality  states,
respectively;  rlH and rL are the probabilities of
being in the  high-  and low-quality  states,  re-
spectively; and / indicates that the wildlife re-
sources are available.4
As illustrated in figure  la by points a and b,
agreeing  to a contingent-payment  contract  of
(SH, SL) will not make the uncertain user worse
off in terms of expected utility, while insuring
supply.  Thus,  this contingent  contract  is one
measure  of the individual's willingness to pay
and is illustrated in figure Ib by point H, where
SH is paid in the high-quality state, SL  is paid
in the low-quality state, and expected utility is
U.5
4 In this  analytic  framework,  uncertainty  is  generated  only by
recreation quality since income is known and participation is cer-
tain.
5  It is worth  noting that an E[S] contract not only results in an
expected utility level of U but also eliminates variability in utility
outcomes.  That is, regardless  of which quality state  materializes,
utility will be  U. Throughout  the discussion of benefit measures,
it is  assumed that the individual is  a strict expected  utility maxi-
mizer and is indifferent between  contingent contracts  of differing
variability but identical levels of expected utility.
Option Price  as a Benefit Measure
A  second  possible  benefit  measure  involves
option  price  (OP). Option price  is the maxi-
mum state-independent  payment the individ-
ual would be willing to make to insure supply;
that is, OP is defined by the following  condi-
tion:
(3)  U = 7n'  UH(Y-  OP, P X,l)
+  7L'  UL(Y-  OP, P, X,  ).
As with E[S], a contingent-payment  contract
of (OP, OP) will  again insure  supply without
making the uncertain user worse off. This ben-
efit measure is illustrated in figure  1a by points
c  and  d,  where,  for graphical  purposes,  it  is
assumed that fH = nL = .5. Thus, OP  is a second
measure of an individual's  WTP, where OP  is
paid  regardless of which  quality  state is real-
ized and  expected utility  is again  U (point K
in figure  lb).
The difference between OP  and E[S] is called
option value (O V). Freeman, Bishop, Graham,
Smith (1982, 1984), and others have examined
conditions  under  which  the  size  and  sign  of
O V is determinate.  This literature  can be use-
ful in adjusting  consumer surplus  benefit  es-
timates under specific circumstances  outlined
in Graham and in Cory and Saliba.
-J
D
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The Expected Value of Fair-Bet  Contingent
Payments as a Benefit Measure
The third benefit measure discussed  involves
payments  that  are,  like the  expected  surplus
payments  (but unlike option  price),  state de-
pendent. As demonstrated by Cory and Saliba,
the process of collecting state-dependent  pay-
ments is connected with no significant  obsta-
cles  not inherently  involved  with  collecting
state-independent payments.  To collect either
option price or state-dependent payments, the
following  would  be  necessary:  (a) uncertain
users would have to be notified that a contract
must be signed to guarantee the availability of
wildlife resources,  (b) exclusion would have to
be possible,  and (c)  contracts  would have to
be enforceable.  An option price contract could
be implemented by collecting this amount and
informing the user that there will be no refund
at the  end of the  period  regardless  of which
quality state is realized.  A contingent  contract
could be  implemented  by collecting  the pay-
ment in the high-quality state or the payment
in the  low-quality  state,  whichever  is larger,
and refunding  the  difference if required.  The
additional requirements,  then, for using state-
dependent payments include monitoring high
or  low quality  for users  and  mailing refunds
when necessary.  Compared to the total cost of
going through a hypothetical compensation ex-
ercise,  the costs of monitoring and mailing re-
funds  is likely to be  small and may not con-
stitute a compelling defense  of option price.6
Once state-dependent  payment schemes are
recognized,  contingent-payment  combina-
tions that result in an expected utility level of
U are  given  by  the  willingness-to-pay  locus
developed  by Graham.  This locus  consists of
all contingent-payment pairs (CH,  CL) that sat-
isfy the following:
(4)  =  n'H  UH(Y-  CH, P, X,  )
+  lL'  UL(Y-  CL,  P, X,  ).
The  definition  of this  locus  insures  that  ex-
pected  utility  when  payments  are  made  and
the good is available is equal to expected utility
when no payments are made and the good is
6  More  fundamentally,  the restrictive  requirements of notifica-
tion, exclusion, and enforceability  will almost invariably obviate
possibilities for  either state-independent  or state-dependent pay-
ments  in the context  of wildlife valuation.  That  is, no  payment
scheme would  be implementable.  Under these circumstances,  se-
lection of  a benefit measure will have to be judged by other criteria.
unavailable,  U.  That  is,  an individual  is in-
different  between  making  any of the pairs  of
contingent  payments  on the locus  and  being
guaranteed access to the resource, and making
no  payments  and  being denied  access  to the
resource.
Assuming the individual is risk averse  (i.e.,
marginal  utility of income is diminishing),  it
is straightforward to show that the willingness-
to-pay  locus  is  concave  to  the  origin.7 This
locus  is illustrated  for  one  uncertain  user  of
wildlife resources in figure lb by WTP. Given
the  user's  probabilities  of being  in  the  two
states, the expected value of the first two ben-
efit measures discussed  (SH,  SL) and (OP, OP)
are illustrated by J and K, respectively.8 In this
case, option value (the difference between OP
and  E[S])  is  positive.  However,  alternative
specifications  of the  willingness-to-pay  locus
could  yield  positive,  negative,  or  even  zero
option value. 9
Estimating maximum willingness to pay in-
volves specifying the contingent-payment pair
on  WTP  which  has  the  maximum  expected
value. This combination is known as the fair-
bet point and, in general, is distinct from both
the surplus  and option  price  combinations. 10
That  is,  neither  E[S] nor  OP correctly  esti-
mates  maximum  willingness  to  pay.  A nec-
essary condition for maximizing the expected
value of contingent  payments (i.e.,  maximiz-
ing E[C] =  rH.CH +  rnLCL) subject  to  (4)  is
that the marginal utility of income be equated
across states. This is illustrated in figure la by
points e and f  where the marginal  utilities in
the high- and low-quality states are equal and
expected  utility  is  U.  l  The fair-bet  payment
7The slope  of the willingness-to-pay  locus is given by
dCF/dCL  =7H  OUHdY
nIL  aULOY'
8  The  expected  value  of  a  contingent-payment  plan  C  is
given by
E(C) = tlHCH +  L' CL.
Thus, a  line through any contingent-payment  combination  with
slope  of -irs/rL  gives  all  combinations  with  the  same  expected
value.
9  The original and more general demonstration of this result was
developed by Schmalensee. A heuristic exposition is given in Bish-
op.
'
1 This  point  is  convincingly  made  in Graham's  analysis  for
situations involving individual (as contrasted with collective) risk.
Individual risk in this context refers to state probabilities varying
across potential  users, a case that frequently  applies to demanders
of wildlife  resources facing quality uncertainty.  Collective risk re-
quires that state probabilities  be invariant across users.
"  In  figure  la, it is assumed that marginal  utility in the high-
quality  state  (MUH)  is greater than  marginal  utility in  the low-
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in the high-quality  state  (FH) and low-quality
state  (FL) occur at point L on the  WTP locus
in figure  1b, where the slope of the individual's
willingness-to-pay  locus equals the ratio of the
state probabilities.  A comparison  of points K,
J, and M illustrates the central analytic result:
the expected value of the fair-bet point E[F1,
not OP or E[S], is the theoretically preferred
benefit measure for an uncertain user of wild-
life  resources.  In general,  use of OP or E[S],
regardless of  their relative magnitudes,  will re-
sult in underestimation  of maximum  willing-
ness to pay for wildlife  resources. 1 2
In summary,  three alternative  benefit mea-
sures have been  discussed for a demander  of
wildlife resources  who is uncertain about rec-
reation quality.  When  OV is positive,  a case
which Freeman has argued will occur frequent-
ly,  E[S] < OP < E[F]. That is,  in the theo-
retical framework of risk-averse expected util-
ity maximization, E[F] is the preferred welfare
measure  of resource  benefits  and  the  use  of
either E[S] or OP will result in an  underesti-
mation bias.
Some users of wildlife resources may be in-
different  to quality uncertainty,  their willing-
ness  to pay  is unaffected  by uncertainty  and
any  use is a "successful"  or high-quality rec-
reational  experience.  Examples  include hunt-
ers who are indifferent about bagging their lim-
it or bird watchers who enjoy observing wildlife
generally  as opposed to wanting  to observe  a
particular rare bird. For these individuals there
is,  in  effect,  no  quality  uncertainty,  and  the
appropriate  benefit  measure is  compensating
variation (consumer  surplus).  In  figure  la, if
the user is certain of enjoying the high-quality
state, then S,  becomes  the monetary measure
of user benefits.
Alternative Benefit  Measures:
Empirical Considerations
Theoretical considerations outlined in the pre-
vious section suggest that for users of a wildlife
quality state (MUL) over the relevant income range. IfMUH = MUL
over  this  range, then  the  fair-bet  and  OP points  coincide.  This
outcome was  inferred by  Freeman  when it was assumed that in-
direct utility was strongly separable in income.  However, Plummer
later  showed  that  such an  assumption  implies  implausible  con-
ditions for the individual's direct utility function.
12Option price represents  maximum willingness to pay, subject
to the  constraint  that payments  are identical  in all states  of the
world.  The fair-bet  point,  as  an unconstrained  measure  of will-
ingness  to pay,  has  an  expected  value  greater  than  or  equal to
option price.
recreation area who view recreation quality as
certain (for them there is no success vs. failure
dichotomy),  consumer surplus (as an approx-
imation for compensating variation) is the ap-
propriate  measure  of site benefits.  Addition-
ally,  for  risk-averse  demanders  who  are
maximizing  expected utility and view recrea-
tion  quality  as uncertain,  E[F] is the appro-
priate  benefit  measure.  In  empirical  applica-
tions,  both  types of resource  demanders  will
utilize  a  given  recreation  area  and  accurate
benefit  estimation  will require  distinguishing
between the two groups.
The necessity for making such a distinction
is illustrated  by the results  of a pretest  ques-
tionnaire  administered  to  members  of  the
American  Birding  Association  (ABA).  The
questionnaire  was designed to measure bene-
fits attributable  to the  use of the Cave  Creek
Recreation Area in southeastern Arizona. Cave
Creek is an internationally known bird watch-
ing area, known for sighting of such rare species
as the Coppery-Tailed  Trogan and the Golden
Crown Kinglet. Twenty-five ABA members fa-
miliar with the Cave  Creek area  volunteered
to participate in the pretest. Of this group, 16%
indicated  that they view recreation quality at
Cave Creek  as certain since  a large variety  of
birds can invariably be sighted, and the sight-
ing of one particular bird does not significantly
affect their willingness to pay. For the remain-
ing  84%,  the  value  of a  visit to  Cave  Creek
would  normally  be predicated  upon  the  pos-
sibility of sighting a specific rare  bird.  Thus,
use of the area was viewed  as enjoyable if no
sighting occurred but much more  enjoyable if
a sighting did occur. 1 3 For this group,  recrea-
tion quality  was uncertain  and  CS estimates
of benefits  would be inappropriate.
Types of Wildlife Recreationists
The  complexity  inherent  in  wildlife  benefit
valuations is illustrated in figure 2. In addition
to distinctions between  certain  and uncertain
demanders of wildlife resources,  the user pop-
ulation is  further divided  with respect  to ex-
pected  utility-maximizing  behavior and  atti-
13This type of state dependence of utility functions is illustrated
in figure  la. Note that utility levels are higher in the low-quality
state when access to wildlife resources is available (U)  than in the
no  access  state  (U)  and are  highest  with  both access  and  high-
quality states (UH).




Figure 2.  Types  of resource  demanders and corresponding benefit measures
tudes  towards  risk.  The  applicability  of
consumer surplus, expected consumer surplus,
option  price,  and  expected  value  of fair-bet
contingency payments as alternative measures
of value is directly dependent upon individual
attitudes toward three factors: uncertainty, ex-
pected utility maximization,  and risk.
For users who are uncertain about recreation
quality,  benefit  estimation  requires an  evalu-
ation of alternative  contingent payment  con-
tracts  for which  the  user  would  voluntarily
contract to insure supply.  In the context of the
Cave  Creek  estimation,  four contingent  con-
tracts were proposed to assess the nature of an
individual's  WTP curve.  Participants  in the
pretest  were  asked  to  state  their  maximum
willingness  to pay for entrance to Cave Creek
to have  the  opportunity  to  view  a rare  bird
under  four  conditions:  (a) no  refund  of pay-
ment regardless of sighting success (i.e., the OP
contract), (b) full refund of payment if  no sight-
ing occurs (i.e., the contract on the WTP locus
which  intersects  the  horizontal  axis  in figure
lb, (c) refund of one-half of the payment if no
sighting occurs  (i.e.,  a contract  on the  WTP
curve between the previous two contracts), and
(d) full refund of payment if a successful sight-
ing occurs (i.e., the contingent contract on the
WTP locus  which  intersects the vertical  axis
in figure  lb.) 1 4
1 4 Responses  by  risk-averse  expected  utility maximizers  were
expected to generate WTP curves concave to the origin while risk-
preferring  responses  would  generate  convex  to the  origin  WTP
Based on  an  evaluation  of responses,  32%
of the respondents  were risk-averse  expected
utility maximizers,  8% were risk-preferring ex-
pected utility  maximizers,  and 44% were  not
expected  utility  maximizers  (i.e.,  contingent-
payment  responses  were  inconsistent  with
either  risk-averse  or  risk-preferring  expected
utility theory),  with the remaining  16% view-
ing recreation quality as certain. The percent-
age breakdown of resource demander types in
the  Cave  Creek  valuation  is  not,  of course,
intended  to be representative.  Use of a larger
sample size, a different wildlife recreation area,
or an  alternative  user  population  would  sig-
nificantly  affect  category  percentages.  How-
ever, the Cave Creek results demonstrate that
wildlife  valuation  projects will involve a user
population  with varying attitudes toward un-
certainty,  expected  utility maximization,  and
risk. The appropriateness  of the CS, E[S], OP,
and E[F]  measures of  benefits depends directly
on which of the four resource demander groups
illustrated in figure  2  is being evaluated.15
curves.  In  addition to  evaluating  contingent-payment  responses
directly,  attitudes  toward risk were measured  by asking each  re-
spondent if they would  accept a fair wager (i.e.,  a bet with a 50%
chance  of winning)  involving the amount of their OP willingness
to pay. Rejection of this fair wager was taken as additional evidence
of risk aversion, while acceptance  gave an additional indication  of
risk-preferring behavior over this incremental range of income.
15  This finding is consistent with Freeman (1984),  Smith (1982)
and others  discussing benefit  measurement under demand uncer-
tainty,  who  note  that the  appropriateness  of alternative  benefit
measures is  dependent on the nature of uncertainty confronting a
potential user and recommend  that empirical  studies identify the
source of  demand uncertainty as a preliminary step in the valuation
process.
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Risk-Averse Expected Utility Maximization
Responses  to  contingent-payment  questions
by  users in  this  demander  category  generate
concave to the origin  WTP curves. In this case,
identifying  E[F] is the correct benefit  proce-
dure.  To  carefully  estimate  E[F] would  in-
volve  asking  enough  contingent-payment
questions  to  enable  a  statistically  significant
regression  analysis to be conducted on the re-
lationship  between CH and CL along the WTP
locus.  As a practical matter, such a procedure
would  prove  onerous  to the respondent  and
impractical  for the analyst. The difference be-
tween  E[F] and  E[S],  option premium,  will
depend  on  the  degree  of risk  aversion,  state
probabilities,  income,  and  the magnitude  of
consumer  surpluses in both  quality states,  so
it is difficult  to specify a priori the  degree  to
which expected surplus estimates will result in
undervaluation.  Since E[F] is always the larg-
est of the three measures discussed, a compro-
mise procedure  would be to report the  larger
of aggregate OP  or E[S] for the user population
and conduct a sensitivity analysis to determine
if refinement of this estimate is likely to result
in different policy prescriptions.  Aggregate OP
or E[S] is a minimum  value estimate  and  if
this exceeds the value of the wildlife recreation
area in proposed alternative uses (e.g., mining,
timber production),  then further efforts to es-
timate the  correct benefit  measure  (aggregate
E[F]) for policy purposes are unnecessary.
Risk-Preferring  Expected Utility
Maximization
Responses  to  contingent-payment  questions
by this demander group generate convex to the
origin  WTP curves.'6 In this case, the contract
which satisfies the necessary conditions for E[F]
represents  a  minimum  benefit  estimate  and
does not apply.  Similarly,  OP is an inappro-
priate measure of site benefits  since either the
expected value  of a full-refund  contract in the
success  state or  the  expected  value  of a full-
refund contract in the failure state will reflect
the maximum  payment a risk-preferring  user
would be willing to make to insure  supply.
16 Responses by  risk-neutral  expected  utility  maximizers  gen-
erate linear  WTP curves. For purposes  of benefit  measurement,
risk-neutral responses are treated as a special case of  risk-preferring








PAYMENT  IN THE HIGH  QUALITY STATE
Figure  3.  Risk-preferring expected  utility
maximization and alternative benefit measures
These estimation relationships  are illustrat-
ed  in figure  3. For this  demander of wildlife
resources, the contract which satisfies the E[F]
necessary conditions  occurs  at A with contin-
gent payments (F,  FL) in the high- and low-
quality states,  respectively.  Given state prob-
abilities, the expected value of this contract is
reflected by point B on the 45-degree line. The
OP  benefit measure is reflected by point C, and
the  E[S] value, given consumer  surplus con-
tingent  payments of (SH,  SL) in the high- and
low-quality states, respectively, is identified by
point D. However, the contingent contract with
the  largest  expected  value  in this example  is
(So,  0),  the  full-refund  in  the  failure  state
agreement.  That is,  use  of any  conventional
contingent  contract  results in undervaluation
of site benefits. The correct welfare measure is
the  larger  of the  expected  values  of the  two
full-refund  contracts,  (So, O) or (0,  Fo).
A three-step  procedure  is required  to esti-
mate site benefits for uncertain, risk-preferring
users  who  are  maximizing  expected  utility.
First,  state  probabilities must  be assigned  or
estimated.  Second,  WTP under both  full-re-
fund policies must be solicited. Third, the larg-
er of XL' Fo and rHq  'So  is then reported as the
measure  of demander benefits.
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Uncertain  Recreation Quality without
Expected Utility Maximization
Responses  to  contingent-payment  questions
by  this  uncertain  demander  group  generate
WTP curves that are inconsistent  with either
risk-averse  or risk-preferring  expected  utility
maximization.  A variety of explanations  may
apply in these circumstances in accounting for
inconsistency  with anticipated  theoretical  re-
sponses: (a) confusion generated by lack of fa-
miliarity  with  contingent-payment  plans,  (b)
risk-averse  behavior  over  one  range  of pay-
ments  coupled  with  risk-preferring  behavior
over remaining payments,1 7 or (c) use of a heu-
ristic other than expected utility maximization
for assessing uncertainty. 18
A pragmatic procedure for individuals whose
responses  are inconsistent  with expected util-
ity maximization would be to report the larger
of  the two conventional benefit measures, E[S]
or OP. The advantages  of this procedure  are
that contingent-payment questions concerning
these contracts can be readily formulated and
comprehended, responses can be easily related
to responses  by other demander groups,  and
the expense of in-depth personal interviews to
fully  assess  the  nature  of  inconsistent  re-
sponses can be avoided. However,  there is no
theoretical  reason to believe that E[S] or  OP
represents maximum willingness to pay for this
user group. Economic benefit estimation under
uncertainty  is based on expected utility  max-
imization,  and there is little theoretical  guid-
ance on how to proceed when this behavioral
model does not apply.
Summary and Implications for
Further Research
Demanders of wildlife resources can be divid-
ed into four groups (summarized in fig. 2) based
on  their  attitudes  toward  recreation-quality
17  Tversky  and  Kahneman  reported  on  an extensive  body  of
experimental results  in  which  individuals  evidenced  risk-averse
behavior  over  income  levels above  their  endowment  and  risk-
preferring behavior over income levels below their endowment.
18 The empirical evidence on expected-utility-maximization  be-
havior is not uniformily reassuring. Shoemaker notes several con-
ceptual drawbacks  and  empirical  counter  examples to  expected
utility theory in his  survey article  on the subject. Kahneman and
Tversky have  proposed prospect theory  as an alternative  specifi-
cation  of behavior  under  risk,  a  specification  largely  consistent
with evidence from  the experimental psychology  literature.
uncertainty, expected utility maximization, and
risk. Accurate benefit estimation requires dif-
ferentiation of the user population with respect
to these  characteristics  since  the  appropriate
welfare measure varies by demander group. In
particular,  the  following  guidelines  are  pro-
posed. First, for resource demanders who view
recreation quality as certain, consumer surplus
(as an approximation  for compensating  vari-
ation) is the appropriate measure of user ben-
efits.  Second,  for  uncertain,  risk-averse  de-
manders  of  wildlife  resources  who  are
maximizing expected utility, the expected val-
ue  of the  fair-bet  contingent  contract  accu-
rately  reflects user's maximum  willingness to
pay to insure supply. For this group of  resource
demanders,  the  larger of option  price  or  ex-
pected consumer surplus can be used as a lower
bound on  user benefits and further refined  if
sensitivity  analysis  suggests  that policy  rec-
ommendations require it. Third, for uncertain,
risk-preferring  resource  demanders  who  are
maximizing expected utility, no conventional
benefit  measure  applies.  For this  user group,
the larger of the expected values of full-refund
contingent contracts is the correct benefit mea-
sure and  the three-step  estimation  procedure
discussed above applies. Finally, for uncertain
demanders who are not maximizing  expected
utility, the larger of option price and expected
consumer  surplus becomes  the pragmatic  es-
timate of user benefits.
Differentiating  wildlife resource  demanders
with  respect  to  uncertainty,  expected  utility
maximization and risk, so that the appropriate
benefit measures may be applied, will increase
the  accuracy  and  theoretical  defensibility  of
benefit  estimates.  However,  implementation
of these recommendations  will require exten-
sive modification of  traditional contingent val-
uation instruments.  In particular,  data collec-
tion instruments will require a dendritic design
that  keys  on  responses  to  initial  screening
questions  concerning  recreation  quality.  Re-
spondents who view recreation quality as cer-
tain  will  branch  to  traditional  questions  de-
signed  to  estimate  consumer  surplus.
Respondents  who  view  recreation  quality  as
uncertain will branch to a series of contingent-
payment questions.  These questions should be
designed  to  estimate  option  price,  expected
consumer  surplus,  and  maximum willingness
to  pay  using  alternative  refund  policies.  Ad-
ditionally,  since  the user population  will typ-
ically  consist  of distinct  subgroups,  sample
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representativeness  will require increased sam-
ple  size  and  minimization  of  potential  re-
sponse  bias.  That  is,  to generalize  from  the
questionnaire sample to the user population as
a whole,  each  subgroup  must be represented
in  sufficient numbers  to insure  statistical sig-
nificance,  and a high response rate is necessary
to minimize  the  possibility  of one  particular
subgroup  being underrepresented  because  of
an unusually low rate of reponse.
While incorporating  these refinements  into
contingent  valuation  procedures  will  not be
costless,  the additional  expense  incurred  ap-
pears  modest relative  to the total cost of con-
tingent valuation processes and will yield more
accurate  and  theoretically  defensible  benefit
estimates.  This  study  also  suggests  that  re-
search  efforts  need  to  be  directed  at  benefit
estimation  for  individuals  who  are  not  ex-
pected  utility  maximizers  since  the  benefit
measures  analyzed  in this study  are not nec-
essarily appropriate  for this group.
[Received January 1987; final revision
received April 1988.]
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162  December 1988The Required Rate of Return for
Publicly  Held Agricultural Equity:
An Arbitrage Pricing Theory Approach
Robert A.  Collins
Recent interest in equity financing  for commercial agriculture  has created the need to
reexamine  the required  rate of return for agricultural  equity. The required rates  of
return  for ten publicly held firms with agricultural  operations are examined with
arbitrage  pricing theory.  The results suggest  that the required rate of return for this
group of firms  is similar to the required rate  of return for an average  share of stock.
Key  words: arbitrage pricing theory,  cost of capital, equity financing.
The well-documented growth in farm size and
associated  increases  in capital  intensity  over
the last thirty-five years have created  difficult
financing  demands  for  the  U.S.  agricultural
sector.  The growth in real assets has exceeded
the  rate at  which  equity  could  be  generated
within the sector, resulting in increases in debt
financing.'  This secular trend  has created  in-
terest  in  mechanisms  for  attracting  external
equity  into  the  farm  sector  (Boehlje;  Fiske,
Batte,  and  Lee;  Collins  and  Bourn;  Moore;
Penson) to give production agriculture a choice
between debt and equity financing. Several in-
stitutional  structures that would allow a pro-
prietary farm to gain access to Wall  Street eq-
uity have been proposed. One proposal (Collins
and Bourn) suggests that a publicly traded real
estate investment trust (REIT) could form lim-
ited  partnership  agreements  with  individual
commercial farms. If the REIT provided a cer-
tain amount of financing in exchange for a share
of the farm's income,  a formal financial inter-
mediary would exist to channel equity financ-
ing from Wall  Street to commercial  farms.  A
mechanism allowing a proprietary farm to at-
tract outside  equity financing  could allow for
I Some of the secular  increase  in the  use of debt  undoubtedly
reflects the choice  to borrow more  and reinvest  less  rather than
the sheer force of expansion. These choices may have been affected
by a general change in attitudes toward debt as well as by incentives
of government agricultural policy (see Gabriel and Baker, Collins).
Robert  A.  Collins  is a  professor of agricultural  economics at  the
University of Arkansas.
orderly firm growth with less financial risk and
thus less turmoil in future difficult times.  The
rate of return that investors  would require to
provide  equity  financing  to  agriculture  de-
pends on the risks associated with agricultural
investments and how these risks affect the risk
of  a well-diversified portfolio. This study brief-
ly evaluates  previous  studies  of the required
rate of return for agricultural investments and
estimates the  required  rate  of return  for ten
publicly held firms with arbitrage  pricing the-
ory (APT).
The  first attempt  to  evaluate  the  required
rate of return  for an  agricultural  investment
was  Barry's  pioneering  capital-asset-pricing-
model  (CAPM)  study  of farmland.  He  re-
gressed  the  earnings  and  capital  gains  from
farmland  on  an  index  and  found  very  little
systematic risk.  From this, he concluded that
the required rate of return to hold farmland in
a  well-diversified  portfolio  is  only  slightly
above the riskless rate. He cautioned, however,
that  the  thin  markets  for land  and  the  illi-
quidity of the investment  could cause the  re-
quired  rate of return  to be higher than what
the CAPM suggested.
The  problem of estimating  a liquidity  pre-
mium  is substantial.  Even  though  economic
theory  suggests that a premium  for both illi-
quidity and  systematic  risk should exist,  the
measurement  of liquidity  and the  associated
premium  is generally  neglected in the litera-
ture.  Since the market models  (CAPM, APT)
Western Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics, 13(2):  163-168
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Table 1.  Regression  Model
Dependent  Variable:  Earnings per Share  of S & P 500 Firms
Independent  Variable:  S & P 500 Index
Coefficient  Standard  Error  t  Ho
=  1.77  a  =  0.32836  t = 5.38  1  (H: a = 0)
f =0.01  I  = 0.00254  t =  -388  (Ho:  f =  1)
Note: R
2 =  .333.
make no provision for illiquidity, the required
rate of return for agricultural investments must
be estimated from the behavior of agricultural
investments  that are  liquid,  that  is,  publicly
traded.
The problem with this approach is that there
are so few publicly traded agricultural  invest-
ments that  are available  for evaluation.  Ad-
ditionally,  the available  sample  is not a very
representative  cross  section  of American  ag-
riculture. This would tempt one to follow Bar-
ry's approach  and evaluate  aggregate  agricul-
tural income.  However sensible this approach
may appear, it neglects an important aspect of
asset pricing. The systematic risk(s) of publicly
traded  ownership  interests  in  assets  may be
very different from the systematic variation in
the income  stream of the assets.  This  occurs
because  the systematic  effects  in the capital-
ization  of income  by equity  markets  are  ig-
nored.  This may be thought of as the system-
atic  capital  gains  and  losses  caused  by  the
changes in the average price-earnings ratio (P/
E).
This problem  may be demonstrated by ex-
amination of a broad-based  market index like
the Standard and Poors (S&P) 500 composite
index.  The returns to the index have by defi-
nition  a systematic  risk (f) of one.  However,
if income  only  is examined,  a  very different
result obtains.  This method was tested by re-
gressing the average earnings per share for the
S&P  500  stocks on the S&P  500 index.  Earn-
ings per share  include recognized  capital gain
income and operating income.  Results of this
regression  using  quarterly  data  from  1975
through  1985  are shown  in table  1. With  an
estimated  3 of 0.01,  it is apparent  that some
systematic risk is being missed. The hypothesis
test for  Ho:3  =  1 yields  a t-value of -388.5.
This creates substantial doubt that risk premia
for equities  may  be  reliably  estimated  from
systematic variation in income alone. This oc-
curs  because the  effects  of systematic  move-
ments  in the average P/E are not considered.
In  addition,  empirical  applications  of the
CAPM have been criticized because empirical
tests  have produced results  inconsistent  with
theory. There have been many of these studies,
a few of which  are Blume and Friend;  Black,
Jensen, and Scholes; Miller and Scholes; Blume
and Husick;  and Fama and Macbeth.  Nearly
all of the studies agree that the intercept of the
security market line is greater than the riskless
rate and that the slope is less than the market
risk premium.  Roll pointed out that previous
tests of the CAPM were really tests of ex post
mean-variance  efficiency of the market index.
He also raised serious questions about the po-
tential for empirically  testing the  CAPM.  All
of this created support for APT, which is more
general  and  apparently  testable  (see  Dybvig
and Ross,  Shankin).
Arbitrage Pricing Theory
The APT model requires no assumptions about
the form  of the distribution  of the return to
assets,  and  no  specific  form  is  required  for
investors'  utility functions.  The market port-
folio is not required to be efficient and, indeed,
is not considered. It allows multiple factors to
influence  asset returns  as  the multiple  index
CAPM does but focuses on unanticipated shifts
in the factors. APT has also survived well from
ten years of empirical scrutiny (Roll and Ross;
Chen; Bower, Bower, and Logue) Comparisons
with the CAPM generally favor APT, and eval-
uations of testing procedures  have not estab-
lished major flaws.  (See Dhrymes, Friend, and
Gultekin  1984 for a critical perspective.) As a
result  of these  theoretical  and  empirical  ad-
vantages, APT is emerging as a preferred mod-
el of asset pricing under risk.
The number of factors  that  may affect the
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price  of individual  assets is very  large.  Most
of these  factors,  however,  are unique to par-
ticular  firms or groups  of firms,  and their  ef-
fects may be diversified  away. Assuming these
idiosyncratic  effects can be eliminated by cost-
less diversification,  they will not affect the re-
turn required  by investors. Factors that cause
well-diversified portfolios to vary in value are
called systematic factors and provide the basis
for market risk premiums.  It is assumed that
investors  incorporate expectations of shifts of
the  systematic  factors  into their expectations
of each  asset's return, and  only the  unantici-
pated changes  in the systematic  factors affect
asset prices.  Therefore,  the basic assumption
of APT may be stated  as follows:
(1)  Ri = E(RI) + /3F + ii,
where  F  is a random  vector of systematic
Nx 1
factors with zero means,  fi  is a vector of sen-
Nx
sitivity coefficients to the systematic factors for
asset i,  Zi  is the return to idiosyncratic factors
lxl
for  asset  i,  (E[e] =  0),  E is the  expectations
operator, and the random rate of return to asset
i is (Ri).
It is presumed that self-interested, risk-averse
investors  will  be  constantly  vigilant  for  op-
portunities  to improve their risk-return  posi-
tion by revising their portfolios or by forming
"arbitrage portfolios."  (A clear and simple ex-
planation of this process  may be found in Roll
and Ross 1984.) Assets with high expected re-
turns  relative  to their systematic  risk will be
bought,  driving  their price  up  and  expected
return  down,  and the opposite  will  occur for
"overpriced"  stocks. Assuming  that investors
are  greedy  and risk averse  and that arbitrage
portfolios  having  no  risk  and  requiring  no
wealth  can earn  no return, 2 Ross shows  that
in equilibrium the expected (and required)  re-
turn on asset i will be
(2) E(R,)  = RF + X'3,
where  X is a vector of market "prices" of risk
Nx 1
associated  with the systematic  factors.
The primary weakness  of the model  is that
it is not clear  what  the  relevant,  i.e.,  priced,
factors  are.  Roll and  Ross (1980)  and  Chen,
2 Other assumptions require  the usual conditions of homogenous
beliefs  and frictionless  markets along with bounded  expectations
and the existence of a type-B agent with nonnegligible  wealth.




Cagles, Inc.  Poultry
Castle and Cooke,  Inc.  Fruits, vegetables
Friona Ind.,  Inc.  Cattle
Katy Ind., Inc.  Shrimp, cheese
Newhall Land and Farming  Wheat,  cotton, sugar
beets, alfalfa
Orange-Co.,  Inc.  Citrus
San Carlos, Inc.  Sugar
Southeastern Public  Service  Miscellaneous crops
Sun City Ind., Inc.  Shell eggs
Tejon Ranch  Co.  Livestock, farming
Roll, and Ross suggest that the real economic
factors  that are  priced  include  unanticipated
changes  in (a) inflation, (b) industrial produc-
tion,  (c) risk  premiums,  and (d)  the slope  of
the yield  curve.  Because  of the obvious data
problems  of observing  unanticipated  shifts,
empirical  APT studies continue to  use factor
analysis to estimate the factors. Following Roll
and Ross (1980) and Bower, Bower, and Logue
(1982,  1984),  this  study  uses  a  four-factor
model.  The factor analysis  model produces  a
set  of four  orthogonal  factor  scores that  best
explain  security returns.
Estimation of APT Parameters
The  data used to estimate  the factor analysis
model were daily returns from all stocks  con-
tinuously listed on the New York and Amer-
ican stock  exchanges  in the period  1 January
1978 through 31 December 1984. These firms
and their primary products are shown in table
2. The daily returns data were collected for the
1,771  stocks meeting this sample criterion from
the  Center  for  Research  in  Security  Prices
(CRSP) tape. Monthly returns were calculated
for each  stock by finding  the geometric mean
of the daily returns. To reduce noise, the  1,761
nonagricultural  stocks  were  grouped  into  57
equally weighted portfolios of about 30 stocks
each from similar industries.3 The 84 monthly
observations  of the  57  portfolios  were  then
factor  analyzed  with  a  four-factor  iterated
3 This  procedure  and  other  estimation  practices  are carefully
evaluated in Bower,  Bower, and Logue  (1982).
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Table 3.  Estimated APT Reaction  Coefficients  for Ten Publicly Held Agricultural Firms
Estimated  APT Coefficients
Firm  a  /2  f3 4  R2
Cagles, Inc.  0.0296*  -0.0460*  -0.0300*  0.0283*  .17
Castle and Cooke, Inc.  0.0479*  -0.0006  0.0062  0.0147*  .33
Friona Ind., Inc.  0.0488*  -0.0006  -0.0023  0.0039  .22
Katy Ind., Inc.  0.0813*  -0.0251*  0.0068  0.0097  .41
Newhall Land and Farming  0.0583*  -0.0114  0.0100  -0.0082  .31
Orange-Co., Inc.  0.0445*  0.0226*  0.0084  0.0005  .13
San Carlos,  Inc.  0.0836*  -0.0199  0.0520*  0.0579*  .30
Southeastern Public Service  0.0183*  -0.0118  0.0105  0.0053  .07
Sun City Ind.,  Inc.  0.0638*  -0.0132  -0.0083  0.0116  .29
Tejon Ranch  Co.  0.0653*  -0.0016  0.0389*  -0.0118  .24
Note: Asterisk indicates  significant at  10% level.
principal  factor  analysis  model.  The  factor
scores  fit the data  well, with an average  com-
munality coefficient of 0.868 over the 57 port-
folios. The APT coefficients  were estimated in
the  standard  fashion  (Bower,  Bower,  and
Logue  1982,  1984)  from  these four  common
factors:
lt,  ..., 64t,  t= 1,...,84.
First, the sensitivity of each of  the fifty-seven
portfolios  to  the  common  factors  was  esti-
mated with time-series regressions. Each port-
folio's return (Ri)  was regressed  on the  factor
scores (65,.  .,  64,)  from the factor analysis (57
regressions,  84 observations  each):
(3)  Rit =  io +  -illt  + ...  +  Ai44t  + Eit
i=  1,...,57.
The estimated values of the beta coefficients
Table 4.  Estimated Required Rates of Return






Cagles, Inc.  11.1
Castle and Cooke, Inc.  18.4
Friona Ind., Inc.  20.2
Katy Ind., Inc.  25.5
Newhall Land and Farming  20.7
Orange-Co.,  Inc.  20.7
San Carlos, Inc.  18.9
Southeastern Public  Service  11.0
Sun City Ind., Inc.  23.5
Tejon Ranch Co.  20.5
Mean  19.05
in equation (3)  were then used to estimate the
lambda coefficients  in equation (2) with cross-
sectional regressions. The portfolio returns for
each month were regressed  on their estimated
betas  from  the  time-series  regressions  (84
regressions,  57 observations  each):
(4)  Rit = X, + Xtil  + ...  + X 41ti4 +  Tit
t= 1,...,84.
The lambdas are the marginal effect of the be-
tas on the required return of the portfolio, and
r is the error term.
The  average  value  of each  of the lambda
parameters over the eighty-four regressions was
used  as  the value  for the APT  model.4 The
annualized  estimated  APT  equation  for  the
market model was
(5)  E(r) = 0.0557  + 2.998,t  +  1.27102
-1.26813  - 0.448F4.
Estimates  of the  required  rate of return for
the ten agricultural firms  required estimating
their  reaction  coefficients.  The  APT  coeffi-
cients were estimated by regressing the returns
from each of the ten agricultural  firms (Ajt) on
the factor scores:
(6)  Ajt  =  jO +  jlA, t  +  .j262t +  Aj3
6
3t  +  fj454t
+7  'yjt  j=  1,...,  10.
The  results  of these  equations  are  shown  in
table 3.
Estimates  of the required rate of return for
the ten agricultural  firms  are  shown in  table
4 This is  the current state of the art in estimating APT models.
See  Roll and  Ross (1980);  Chen;  and Bower,  Bower,  and  Logue
(1982,  1984).
166  December 1988Agricultural  Equity  167
4.5 Estimates of the required rate of return for
each  firm  were  derived  by  substituting  esti-
mated reaction coefficients from equation into
market equation (5). These estimates are shown
in table 4. The average required rate of return
for the ten sample  firms was  19.05%.  The re-
quired rate of return for the average share over
the sample period was slightly higher at 20.8%.
It does not appear that the required return for
the average  of the firms is different in any im-
portant  sense  from  all  stocks.  The  APT esti-
mates  are higher than the CAPM estimates  in
Collins and Bourn because of differences in the
riskless rate  and  the expected  market return.
In Collins and Bourn, estimates of current val-
ues were used. When estimates from the sam-
ple period  are used,  the  average  CAPM  esti-
mate for the ten firms is higher than the APT
estimates at 21.25%. These estimates are much
higher than Barry's estimates for farmland be-
cause systematic  risk from changes in the P/E
ratio  are  considered.  Presumably,  equity  in-
terests  in illiquid  agricultural  assets with  the
same systematic risks would be higher because
of the liquidity premium.
Summary and Conclusions
This  paper  estimates  with  arbitrage  pricing
theory  the  return  investors  require  to  hold
publicly traded equity investments  in ten ag-
ricultural  firms and compares these estimates
to conventional  capital-asset-pricing-model
estimates.  The model indicates a much higher
required  rate  of return  than previously  esti-
mated with annual data for farmland, but APT
estimates  are  slightly lower than CAPM esti-
mates  for  publicly  held  agricultural  stocks.
Based on the small number of firms available
for study, there is no compelling reason to be-
lieve that the required rate of return for pub-
licly traded agricultural equities is any different
than for other publicly  traded  equity  invest-
ments. This suggests that the investment com-
munity  regards  the  effect  of agricultural  in-
vestments on the riskiness of  a well-diversified
portfolio  to be neither excessive  nor minimal
and stands ready to provide equity capital  for
agriculture if provided reasonable terms and a
viable  institutional  structure.  Given  that
5  Since the  first factor  has the  largest coefficient  [equation  (5)]
and estimates of  , differ substantially between  firms  (table 3),  it
appears that the  first factor is responsible for a large part  of the
difference in required rate of return between firms.
investors'  requirements  are accurately reflect-
ed by this small sample  of firms and the pre-
vailing rates of return to equity in commercial
agriculture,  the average farm could not sell eq-
uity at par to an agricultural equity pool unless
investors expected substantial capital gains. It
appears that investors might be interested only
in the small  proportion  of commercial  farms
that  are  very  well  managed  and  highly  suc-
cessful.
[Received January 1988; final revision
received May 1988.]
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